한국의 은행들이 자와 9, 10호기 사업에 투자하는 이유가 무엇인가?
동남아에 필요한 것은 오염시설인 석탄발전소가 아니라 재생에너지라는 목소리에 힘을 모아주세요
Advertising in Chosun, Kyunghyang and Korea Times, 25 November 2019
한국산업은행(KDB), 한국수출입은행(KEXIM), 무역보험공사(K-SURE)가 인도네시아 반텐 주에 2,000MW급 석탄화력발전소인 자와 9, 10호기를 건설하는 사업에 투자를 하려 한다는 사실이 알려지면서 심각한 우려를 낳고 있습니다. 자와 9, 10호기는 이미 환경적 및 법적으로 큰 문제를 안고 있는 사업입니다. 한국의 공적 금융기관들은 이런 사업에 투자하여 국제적인 비난을 받지 않도록 하루빨리 투자 의사를 철회해야 합니다.
반텐 수랄라야, 2018. 9.
이 사업은 2,000MW 규모로 초초임계압 기술을 적용할 예정.
소재 : 반텐 주
예상 공사비용 : USD 35억
금융종결 예정 : 2019
현재 상태 : 사업 계획 발표
완공 예정 : 2024
지금 여러분의 목소리가 필요합니다 !
한국이 자와 9, 10호기 투자를 철회하고 재생에너지의 리더가 되도록 목소리를 모아주세요.
한국수출입은행, 한국산업은행, 무역보험공사 귀하,
인도네시아 자와 9, 10호기 신규 석탄화력발전소에 대한 투자 의사를 철회할 것을 요청드리기 위해 본 서신을 보냅니다.
석탄화력사업으로 발생하는 오염은 환경뿐 아니라 인근 마을 주민들의 생계와 생명을 위협합니다. 또한 이미 세계에서 가장 대기오염이 심각한 도시로 손꼽히는 인도네시아의 수도 자카르타의 대기오염을 더욱 심화시킬 것입니다. 대규모 석탄화력발전소인 자와 9, 10호기가 가동연한 동안 내뿜는 대기오염물질로 인해 총 4,700명의 조기사망자가 발생할 것으로 예상되고 있는 상황입니다.
자와 9, 10호기가 들어서는 지역은 전기보급율이 이미 99.99%에 달해 새로운 석탄화력발전소가 필요하지도 않습니다. 아시아 전역에 걸쳐 재생에너지가 석탄발전보다 빠른 속도로 저렴해지고 있는 상황을 고려하면 이 석탄발전소는 머지 않아 좌초자산으로 전락하고 말 것입니다.
사람이 살 수 있는 환경을 유지하기 위해서는 더 이상 화석연료에 기반한 발전소를 지어서는 안 된다는 사실을 이제 누구나 알고 있습니다. 한국 정부는 석탄화력발전소에 대한 자금 지원을 즉시 중단하고 세계가 재생에너지로 전환하는 데에 힘을 보태야 합니다.
한국수출입은행과 한국산업은행 및 무역보험공사는 결코 자와 9, 10호기 사업에 투자를 해서는 안 됩니다.
Risks associated with the project
Community concerns and legal challenges
On August 29, citing health and environmental concerns, Indonesian and Indonesian plaintiffs filed a petition to Seoul’s district court for an injunction to stop Korean public banks financing Java 9 and 10.
Java 9 and 10 also form a part of a legal action in Indonesia. In July 2019, a civil suit was filed against the President, the governor of Jakarta and other officials for failing to address air pollution levels in Jakarta. Pending projects such as Java 9 and 10 have been cited as part of the problem.
A 2017 Greenpeace report models the negative impact of the coal-fired power plants that operate within 100 kilometres of Jakarta, and include the impact of pending projects.
The area around the project is an industrial area with several coal power projects:
- 660 MW Banten Serang supercritical coal power project
- 600 MW Banten Labuan coal power project
- 945 MW Banten Lontar subcritical coal power project
- 120 MW Merak Energi coal power project
- 200 MW PT Krakatau Posco Energy coal power project
- 400 MW PT Krakatau Daya Listrik coal power project
- 300 MW PT Dian Swastika Sentosa coal power project
- 40 MW Cilegon PTIP power station to power the Indorama petrochemical plant
- 300 MW Asahimas Chemical coal power project
- 1,982 MW Jawa 7 supercritical coal power plant (projected in service in 2020)
The issues with these projects will only be exacerbated by Java 9 and 10.
Banten Suralaya, March 2019; photo credit: Trend Asia
Wasted electricity, wasted investment
If built, Java 9 and 10 will do little to help the average Indonesian get access to electricity and will lead to wasted electrical capacity.
The Java-Bali grid, where this project is located, already has some of the highest rates of electrification in the country (99.99%).This has raised questions about whether extra power stations are needed.
According to the latest energy plan (RUPTL), the current reserve margin (excess capacity as a percentage of expected peak demand) in the Java-Bali grid is 28%.Although the Java-Bali grid is required to meet 80% of the Indonesian demand for power, around 40% of the electricity produced was not being used, according to statements by PLN’s CEO in November 2017.
So Java 9 and 10 could be producing electricity that would go largely unused.
PLN’s poor financial health
It’s also clear that this overcapacity could significantly harm PLN’s already poor financial health.
Because of the take-or-pay clauses in power purchase contracts, PLN has been criticised as potentially paying for unnecessary electricity. Even more farcical, as renewable energy becomes cheaper than coal power, (which the Carbon Tracker initiative estimates could happen for solar in Indonesia in less than 10 years) PLN faces the prospect of having to make these astronomical payments to coal power projects although the power sourced from them is more expensive.
PLN is facing financial pressure, even now. In April 2018, the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis released a further report showing that without government subsidies, PLN would have lost US$2.3 billion in 2016 and US$1.47 billion in 2017.
PLN’s financial viability has serious consequences for the Indonesian state budget. The Korean government should be more concerned about promoting its Asian neighbour’s financial hardship.
Negative effect of the Indonesian Rupiah crisis
The weakness of the Indonesian currency also has prompted concerns about the viability of these planned coal projects.
In September 2018, the Indonesian government planned to delay approximately 15GW of coal power projects because of its widening current account deficit. Java 9 and 10 were originally slated to be part of this delay. It is unclear whether the project completion date has been shifted as a result.
Coal power, PLN and corruption in Indonesia
As stated by Global Witness campaigner Adam McGibbon, “Not only is coal increasingly risky, climate-destroying and bad for air pollution, there is now a huge and underestimated corruption risk.“
In May 2019, Hyundai Engineering & Construction admitted to bribing an Indonesian politician in relation to the Cirebon coal-fired power plant construction project in West Java. In October 2019, Hyundai Engineering & Construction’s Executive Director was questioned in the Korean parliament about this project.
In July 2018, the Indonesian Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) arrested Eni Mulani Saragih (Eni), the deputy chair of the House of Representatives (DPR) Energy Commission and Johanes Bidisutrisno Kotjo (Kotjo). Eni was alleged to have received IDR$4.8 billion from Kotjo, to facilitate a company in which Kotjo was a shareholder to become the sponsor of a coal power project in Indonesia.
Coal barge on fire off the coast of Banten Suralaya, March 2019; Photo credit: Trend Asia
What should the Korean banks do?
Given these concerns, the Korean public institutions contemplating lending to this project should be considering the risks of Java 9 and 10 as an investment. KEXIM, KDB and K-SURE should distance themselves from this project.
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